Can 42 cops speak for all 730,000 to increase police state surveillance?

There are about 800,000 people in local and state law enforcement with more 730,000 sworn officers who can make arrests. The FBI has about 12,000 agents who work on counterterrorism operations. A new counterterrorism intelligence report states, "The implications of this disparity are self-­evident, federal authorities will never have the number of eyes and ears available to counterterrorism that local police do." That logic is not flawed, but the statistics in the Counterterrorism Intelligence Research report are. If research suggested the U.S. counterterrorism intelligence machine should be ramped up in favor of more domestic surveillance by local law enforcement, then shouldn't that research include more than 42 cops?  

George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) started a long term Counterterrorism Intelligence Survey Research (CTISR) program that "represents the first attempt to systematically collect data from counterterrorism professionals at all levels of government." Yet a sample question for 'local police' in the report, Counterterrorism Intelligence: Law Enforcement Perspectives [PDF] was: "Would you be willing to ask your sources and informants to fulfill intelligence requests from other agencies or entities?" 93% - which looks very high - said yes to this previously "untapped" source of counter-intelligence to combat terrorism with "increased collection" in order to "provide a richer picture of the threat." There were 44 such questions, but only 42 people in law enforcement were included in this study. It's further qualified by saying not all of the 42 answered each question. Even the authors of the study felt compelled to point out, "From a purely statistical standpoint, such a sample raises questions about the generalizability of HSPI's findings."

The report states that more data and analysis will be needed before "informed judgments" can be made, but the "findings represent the perceptions of the intelligence commanders of major metropolitan police departments - their perceptions and opinions should be taken seriously." The authors warn that conclusions from this study and interpreting the data should be done "with care," but it is especially worrisome that the percentages from this research will be the stats cited in the future, without going over the fact that only 42 of 730,000 law enforcement officers sworn to uphold the law were surveyed in this first study.

Also according to this research, counterterrorism law enforcement officers expect the terror threat to evolve with homegrown extremists / domestic terrorists perceived as the greatest threat, even above Al-Qaeda or international terrorists. This is followed by gangs/organized crime, terror support groups, drug trafficking organizations, with traditional criminals coming in last as a perceived significant danger to local police.

22 law enforcement officers said they model their own collection efforts after the FBI, four use DHS for their collection model, and five others emulate the CIA and military intelligence in collecting intelligence. Primary sources for counterterrorism intelligence and information sharing included suspicious activity reports and exchanging or accessing data collected by fusion centers. Most of the police surveyed were in support of more information sharing such as incident and case reports, bookings, incarceration, parole and probation data from all U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Law enforcement also supports FBI's National Data Exchange (N-DEx), the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), the Department of Justice Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), and the FBI's eGuardian for sharing sensitive information and suspicious activity reports. Yet one cop wrote in the comments about why their department chose not to participate in the FBI's eGuardian program; it has "Bad policy, or lack thereof to protect privacy rights. Terrible, inconsistent marketing of program. Inconsistent policies and procedures. Poor leadership, as indicated by frequent turnover. Lack of coordination with fusion centers."

It's unknown if, in this tiny fraction of law enforcement questioned, there is any bias. Two of the cops frequently talk with heads of fusion centers, so are they buddies? That creates another flaw, as does the bias of counterterrorism experts being surveyed for the whole of law enforcement's opinion. It seems unlikely that most police in smaller towns would agree with these counterterrorism cops that We the People pose the biggest terrorist threat to our own country. In the staggering amounts of surveillance data collected about people, too much old data, less focus on new gadgets and technology, and more focus on how-to best analyze the data were also cited as concerns by some of the police.

As seen with the deluge of suspicious activity reporting done by the Mall of America's security team, which often results in shoppers, mall visitors and otherwise innocent people ending up in counterterrorism databases, connecting meaningful dots to fight terrorism is more art than science. Yet this law enforcement counterterrorism intelligence report of only 42 people in law enforcement concluded, "In short, with such data it will be possible to bring a little science to the art of counterterrorism intelligence."

Sometimes it seems that everywhere we look in regards to surveillance and technology clashing with privacy and then losing civil liberties, "We have met the enemy and he is us," as cartoonist Walt Kelly put in his Pogo comic strip.