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The current state of security is no surprise

Tell us something we didn't know.  That's what I thought when I read this CW article about the state of security.  My snide comments aside however, I think this is the most articulate explanation for why security isn't getting any better.  And as far as I can tell, it's right on the money.

For starters, security isn't getting any better, no matter how hard companies are struggling to improve it and how much of the budget those companies sink into it.  And all it takes to see just how all of those efforts aren't working, is to look at the news on any given day.  It's never more than a few days between announcements for the latest security breach.

All of these efforts don't work because of the changing nature of computer hacking.  As Lemon points out in this article, hackers today are not what they used to be.  Unfortunately, the image of those hackers hasn't evolved with the changes.  For example, when you hear the term hacker, what do you think of?  Most people think of a pasty-faced teenager that spends entirely too much time in front of the computer or one of the 80's computer geeks that were so popular in early moving about computer hacking.

In truth, a hacker might be the guy sitting next to you on the train or in the next cubicle in the office.  For that matter, hackers can be well-respected business mean or thugs that hang out on the corner.  And that's the point.  Hackers are just like the other criminals in today's society--they're hard to distinguish from anyone else, and they're motivated by either (most frequently) financial or personal gain.  First generation hackers were about gaining access.  Today's hackers only care about access in as much as it's needed to gain a financial payoff.

So, according to Bruce Schneier, as written in the CE article:

"Look for the economic levers," he said. "If you get the economic levers right, the technology will work. If you get the economics wrong, the technology will never work."

What more can I add?  Schneier has hit the the ball right into the corner pocket.  It might even be the missing link in preventing security breaches.  In order to stop other types of crime, like terrorism and drug trafficking, on of the most used strategies for preventing the spread of the crime is to cut off the financial supply.  Since hacking has become a crime about money, finding a way to stop the money flow will go a long way toward stopping the crime.

How do we do that?  It's got to start with education.  Education of consumers and of the companies with which those consumers do business is a good start.  And great strides in education have been made.  But beyond that, there may also need to be a change in behaviors.  Companies will need to change their online marketing tactics and consumers will have to change their online behaviors.

It's all well and good in theory, but putting it into practice is a much different story.  And it's one that's still be written.  

What People Are Saying

The idea of holding software

The idea of holding software producers liable for the failures in their software inevitably misses the fact that the software producers will just roll the extra cost into the software anyway. If you want more secure software, pay for it. The legions of enterprises that use insecure software are a testiment to the fact that most companies don't value security enough to pay for it.

Considering that, maybe the pain needs to fall on the companies that keep choosing insecure software.

Education is pretty much

Education is pretty much exhausted as a means of addressing the problem, I think. I am also not really sure it was all that efficient in the first place as it works as a solution to the result and doesn't really address the source of the problem, I think. And one of the problem sources is that the way security is implemented in software is overly complicated and with a somewhat much flat learning curve for those developers interested, if any. Complexity leaves rooms for errors and that's how you get security bugs. OOP with its "blackbox" promise can provide an answer there but I still have to see one in the making.

A separate source I think is that there aren't really any case-specific and easily applicable benchmarks by which you'd know if your implementation is secure or not. Hope there's going to be some investment in research there soon as most security departments I know of are slumped with 'mop-up' type of work...

When are software companies

When are software companies going to be made responsible for selling 'lemons'. If auto makers, medical supply companies, toy companies, etc. are liable for faulty products, why aren't software companies being made liable for their faulty products?

The reason why is because we buy autos, drugs and toys, but we license software. We don't own it, we just use it. Microsoft, et al, own the software and need only answer to themselves. The EULA (End-User License Agreement) says so. Frustrating, but true.

Second, autos, drugs and toys are held mainly to safety standards, not efficacy. For the most part if an auto, drug or toy doesn't hurt or kill, it's OK. Spreadsheets and word processors don't hurt or kill when they break.

Yes, drugs must perform as advertised and autos must follow CAFE, DOT and EPA standards. But all of these grew out of preventing harm to the public by snake-oil salesmen and cars without seatbelts. The first time someone dies from a "Blue Screen of Death" is when you'll see a call for legislation.

I agree with the statement

I agree with the statement made by IDG about liability however I think this needs to be very careully handled as the term secure and bug free have become, in a lot of peoples eyes, synonymous and I believe this is a serious mistake. Also a lot of the holes and opportunities that hacker's exploit are the result of unpatched systems due to user laziness etc in not patching.

This in no way frees any software company from liabilty etc for negliegence etc.

However the flip sude is also true. Can you imagine the uproar if MS or anyone else shipped an OS with mandatory patch installations and there was no way to turn it off?

Just a few thoughts on what is an interesting and complex issue.

I think one of the key

I think one of the key points made by IDG and Bruce Schneier about security is, "To improve the security of software, Microsoft Corp. and others should be made liable for selling software that is not secure. 'When you use buggy software and you lose data, that's your loss and not the software company's loss',Schneier said."

When are software companies going to be made responsible for selling 'lemons'. If auto makers, medical supply companies, toy companies, etc. are liable for faulty products, why aren't software companies being made liable for their faulty products?

Is it a matter of 'who has their hand in whose pockets' or 'society isn't motivated enough to push this issue'?

It's a scary thing, that's for certain.

There will always be

There will always be vulnerabilities in software. There is no way that every possibility can be thought of when building the software.

Just because you have a fence around a building to keep people out, the front desk person still may let someone in who shouldn't be there. Does that mean that the fence company is at fault.

There are several ways to make sure that your data is secure and not lost without just blaming the software for it.