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Scott McPherson's picture
Scott McPherson

Tiptoeing Through Minefields

We have met the enemy, and he is us.

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Rated +6
128 Votes

Who can forget the classic line uttered by Commodore Perry during the War of 1812's Battle of Lake Erie: "We have met the enemy and they are ours!" Perry, then age 28, kicked serious British naval butt in that decisive victory.

Nearly two centuries later, the famed comic strip creator Walt Kelly twisted that line for the benefit of his seminal character, the possum Pogo. On an Earth Day poster in 1971, Pogo, looking at a polluted stream proclaimed, "We have met the enemy and he is us!" The same line was also used in a cartoon to lampoon the Nixon Administration, so the creator's use was to point a critical finger at things government, in Kelly's opinion, was doing wrong.

You, dear Reader, are probably asking, Why are we going through this lesson?

Because of headlines like the ones found in many IT publications this week: Feds look to local law enforcement to help stop terrorists.

Gee, what a revelation! Let me tell you a story about what happened here in Florida that had direct bearing on 9/11, could have even stopped 9/11, and still is not taken as seriously as it should.

You see, Mohammed Atta was a terrible driver. He turned out, regrettably, to be a much more capable pilot than a motor vehicle operator. He was such a bad driver that he was stopped and issued citations for motor vehicle moving violations in Florida not once, but twice, in just a matter of weeks!

His first ticket was in Broward County, the home of Ft. Lauderdale and its suburbs. Atta was living in Coral Springs at the time, a nice bedroom community in Northwest Broward. He failed to appear in court for his hearing (Geez, I wonder why?), and a bench warrant was immediately issued for his arrest.

Fast-forward to a few weeks later. Atta is pulled over again for a moving violation, this time in southern Palm Beach County, about 15 driving minutes from his first citation.

Here's the rub, as the Bard would say: Broward County did not put its bench warrants into any kind of an information system that could be searched by other law enforcement agencies. Thus, the officer in Palm Beach County was unaware of Atta's bench warrant in next-door Broward. He is issued yet another citation and is sent on his way.

The next time we saw Atta, it was via his drivers license photo, with those evil glaring eyes, in the immediate wake of 9/11. His incinerated body was hypothetically headed to paradise to comingle with those vestal virgins. I prefer to think he is damned for all Eternity in the pits of Hell.

As the press descended upon Broward County, the facts of Atta's infractions became known. I was amazed at the lack of outrage at this inability to share simple data between local governments.

What ideally should have happened is this: Once Atta failed to appear in Broward court, his bench warrant should have been entered into a statewide database that the Feds could have tapped into. That same database would have been connected into the NCIC and FCIC (for Florida) computer systems. In Palm Beach County, the officer who pulled Atta over a second time would have been made aware of the outstandng bench warrant. Gun drawn and having radioed for backup, the officer would have pulled Atta from the vehicle and brought him to the Palm Beach County Jail. His One Phone Call would have been made, and his car impounded.

At the impound yard, a curious investigator might have seen certain drawings, diagrams, blueprints, and notes. He might have seen flight manuals and textbooks and gotten more curious. A call to the FBI might have produced zip, zilch, nada, since the FBI and CIA were famously not talking regarding which baddie was and was not in the country at the time. So this is all just so much "woulda, shoulda, coulda."

We do know that the CIA-FBI feud was a major contributing cause of 9/11's horribly destructive event. But how many of you knew about this other one? A vertical failure.

If we learned anything about 9/11, it is what I have referred to with Colin Powell's Rules: Check Small Things. It will always be the small things that trip you up, be you a bank robber or a terrorist.

Unfortunately, since 9/11, nothing of real substance has apparently changed in the data-sharing arena. Part of that has to do with the inability of many local governments to post such previously-mundane bench warrant data into larger, searchable law enforcement computer systems. And the Justice Department has, to its credit, moved forward aggressively with its Global Justice XML programs and has all-but-required adoption of that schema as a condition of Federal funding for justice data projects.

But the largest part of the problem has to do with a lack of Homeland Security funding for data enhancement and data acquisition. While such glaringly obvious terrorist targets such as Fargo, North Dakota were busy buying antiterror armor and nuke-sniffing devices with earmarks courtesy of their US Senators, the rest of the nation was unable to get the funding for things that matter much more, with much higher returns on investment: New computer programs, more staff to input information, and better data query and retrieval devices for local law enforcement officers.

Let me tell you another story. While CIO at Florida's corrections agency, I fought for years to have a company out of Louisville called Appriss come in to hook into our mainframe. Appriss has this amazing product, called JusticeXchange. This company gets its hooks into city and county jail management and booking computer systems. It can then match arrest and booking data with State and Federal computer systems.

The benefit is that a probation officer can be electronically notiified if one of their probationers is arrested anywhere in America that Appriss operates (about 70% of U.S. jail management systems, as of two years ago). And it works. The Florida Department of Corrections finally gave the green light to the project, and used it first as a pilot to find some of the 40,000+ 'absconders" who are on the lam, as they say.

JusticeXchange found about ten percent of the absconders, who were either tucked away in other jails or were on probation in other states! That is more than 4,000 absconders. By the way, about a half-dozen were actually in Florida jails, under their own names! Human failings caused those names never to have been checked against other criminal databases.

Today, in Florida (or at least when I left Corrections), if any inmate or probationer got arrested for anything anywhere within Appriss' reach, a probation officer was electronically and automatically notified -- as was his/her supervisor -- within fifty minutes of the person being booked into a jail, and well before they might be able to bond out at First Appearance. If that does not underscore the power of information sharing, I cannot tell you what does.

We have spent tens of billions of dollars on reactive antiterrorism gear. I am sure that is important for the residents of Fargo and other towns. Yet we have spent a comparatively paltry sum of cash on solutions that actually might stop terror before it happens. And one of those ingenious things that actually worked, Seisint founder Hank Asher's brilliant MATRIX system, remains mired in controversy and politics. Hank showed me MATRIX just a few short weeks after the 9/11 attacks. Using law enforcement data and commercial data, all of the commercial data available in the public domain, Asher's query produced Atta's photo -- and about 80 others, many of them fellow 9/11 hijackers, many of them associates of the 9/11 hijackers.

It was simple data mining and algorithms, and none of the information was obtained illegally. But the prospect of such powerful data mining was apparently anathema to those who feign surprise at such matters. The politicians' collective "shock" reminded me of the classic line uttered by Claude Rains in Casablanca. Rains, as Captain Renault, says "I am shocked — shocked — to find that there is gambling going on here!" Then the casino employee hands Rains some cash and says, "Your winnings, sir."

Why the mock horror? Political parties have been mining similar data for cash and votes for over a decade, maybe longer. They have been using many of the same databases, and many of the same techniques, with very effective results.

We have gamma-ray detectors for looking into tractor trailers without opening the doors. We have thousands and thousands of bomb suits, anthrax response suits, atom bomb detectors the size of a pack of Marlboros, and huge chem/bio truck depots in places so remote that terrorists couldn't find them with a Garmin and a Navaho scout.

But we can't unify all the nation's jail booking systems, and all the bench warrant systems, and all the other data systems, because it costs too much, or people are fearful of losing their control over the data, or they don't want to lose the ability to take credit for something.

One thing's for certain: These criminals -- and terrorists are criminals -- will continue to make small mistakes. And until we can link the small mistakes with the Bigger Picture, I guess we will need all that other stuff.

What People Are Saying

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Rated +4
14 Votes

The article repeats what is

The article repeats what is no better than gossip or self-promotion regarding MATRIX. As Jeff Jonas (creator of NORA and now at IBM) pointed out in an article published by the Cato Institute, the "discovery" by MATRIX of 12 of the 19 hijackers -- out of a set of 1,800 positives -- boils down to a 99% false positive rate and a 37% false negative rate. These abismal statistics were produced after everything about the 9/11 plot was known!

The fact is that statistical pattern recognition is useless for detecting terrorist plots. Adding more data is useless. Commercial data is full of errors and mainly irrelevant to developing a terrorist plot. Law enforcement data has even more errors -- because it constitutes reports that do not have to be perfect because they don't lead to anything else, like accurate credit card bills. So the data is bad. What about the other necessary ingredient of data mining: a set of vetted and accurate true positive cases? How many terrorist plots have occurred in the US in the past 20 years? Excluding abortion clinic bombings (which Ashcroft stopped the DoJ from counting as terrorism shortly after 9/11), on the order of 10. At the level of detail in the data -- law enforcement, commercial, throw in what ever you want -- none of these represent similar cases needed to do classifier training.

The main value of data sharing is for figuring out what happend; useless for interdiction.

Rate this
Rated +5
23 Votes

Not complicated or sinister....

I do information security for a company that does criminal justice data sharing.

I read lots of stories like this one, and the user comments always share a common theme. Folks seem to think government or LE is trying to do something very complicated, very advanced, with technology, and that it will be used (or abused) in sinister ways.

What we are trying to do isn't that complicated. Private sector figured this stuff out years ago, it takes technology forever to trickle into law enforcement.

Lets use the pharmacy industry as an example. A few years ago individual pharmacies within a chain weren't connected. If you normally filled your prescription at the Walgreens by your house, your information would not be available to the folks working at the Walgreens by your office. They would have to call, and manually retrieve your information. They'd also need to see you insurance card, and do a great deal of double entry.

I remember when Walgreens started advertising that all their stores were connected. No more calling the other store, just a few pecks on the keyboard, and your info was available to the staff at whatever store you were in.

Law enforcement operates in that disconnected state.

The author of this article is talking about a system that helped them find Florida parole absconders, some of which were sitting in Florida jails for other crimes.

It seems like they should have known that already. I don't understand why people have outrage when law enforcement uses technology to figure these things out. Shouldn't there be outrage that they didn't have that information in the first place?

These "data sharing" initiatives are often misunderstood because they represent a very rudimentary level of "sharing." Everyone assumes that this level of sharing is already in place, and that these systems must be something more complex than the basic tool that they really are.

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Rated +2
18 Votes

Author, To continue with the

Author,
To continue with the pharmacy example, Appriss also has a product called MethCheck. Pioneered in the Louisville area, MethCheck collects information about buyers of meds like Sudafed and Claritin-D. It uses the data to help impose limits on the amount of said drugs one can buy.

The information is already collected -- on paper. This new solution stops people who figured out long ago they could jump from pharmacy to pharmacy to skirt the law. MethCheck collects the data and allows the pharmacy, with the swipe of the person's drivers license, to deny the purchase of those meds that can be cooked to create meth -- regardless of the pharmacy they went to.

Needless to say, it has been a huge success. Other retailers are setting up either that system or competing systems, in order to deny sales and comply with State law.

Now, many readers will say this MethCheck solution is an unfair intrusion into their private lives. But they fail to understand these laws have been set in place for years. Only now, affordable technology allows the rapid enforcement of these laws -- whether people agree with them or not.

Everyday people think government -- especially law enforcement -- is like "24." People think every bloody database on the planet is connected and Chloe can just hack in and get Jack Bauer everything he needs.

In reality, most of government IT is like Jericho after the bombs dropped. I am with you on the outrage about why these solutions weren't in place sooner.

Watch this space for my forthcoming proposed solutions to these government problems.

PS, I own no Appriss stock. I am a big fan of the company, obviously.
Scott

Rate this
Rated +3
39 Votes

With a database that large,

With a database that large, unwieldy, and insecure, how difficult would it be to insert a fake arrest warrant? With thousands of individual, unlinked databases across the country, the security threat is very localized. Once all of these podunk town databases become linked, they'll be the weakest link in the chain for someone to harass you.

Securing this thing is, of course, the last thing the government will think about, if they think about that at all.

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Rated +4
20 Votes

Hey, I asked my editor to

Hey,
I asked my editor to brighten up my response a bit. Sorry if I crossed a line.
Scott

Rate this
Rated +2
36 Votes

Excuse me,

Who needs large databases? SHARE DATA, not store data.

Believe it or not, law enforcement has some pretty good standards for entering data. "Podunk town databases" is an elitist comment without grounds in fact.

I think those who talk about fraudulent data entry and such are protesting a little too much.
Scott

Rate this
Rated +3
27 Votes

Whether the data is all

Whether the data is all condensed into a single location as a repository, or stored in a distributed fashion across hundreds of thousands of computers scattered throughout law enforcement agencies and made accessible by web services, it conceptually is still a single 'database'. If you want to get all uptight about the term 'database' and what its specific meaning might be, fine. The point still remains that once the information becomes widely available in the described fashion, the whole system is subject to the weakest link. (And yes, I am in IT, whether the original commenter was or not.)

There may be great practices and procedures in place for many of the more advanced and technologically competent law enforcement agencies. There may be many very concientious law enforcement personnel in many 'podunk' towns. But just as demonstrably there are many such 'podunk' towns where the law enforcement officers don't care to exercise such care or are corrupt or are more interested in being in good with their buddies around town and juvenile enough to allow pranks even if they don't participate directly themselves in said pranks. I grew up in a rural area and have seen it with my own eyes. So, no, those who raise the spectre of fraudulent data entry in fact are not protesting too much. It is a very real danger, although personally I think there are far worse dangers lurking.

Rate this
Rated +7
25 Votes

Thanks for your comments.

Thanks for your comments. Yes, there are worse dangers lurking than some redneck deputies who want to have fun at someone's expense. Those agencies eventually have to answer to the Feds, because all criminal history data gets rolled up to the NCIC, which is maintained by the FBI. It is actually rolled up to Washington by the 50 State law enforcement or state police agencies, and any attempt at entering fraudulent data could wind up getting a sheriff suspended by a governor of one of those 50 states.

Let's get everything straight here. We are basically talking about linking court and corrections data nationwide, which is decidedly not podunk and not, therefore, subject to the whims of "podunk" law enforcement agencies. Court and corrections data is where everything comes together. Bench warrants can only be entered by court personnel. If someone wants to enter a bogus bench warrant as a prank, there are many, many opportunities for wronged people to resolve the problem. That is no reason to not move forward with such programs as data sharing for purposes of catching some very, very bad people.

The chances of an innocent being wronged because of an absence of data are, in fact, far greater than the chances of an innocent being wronged because of an abundance of data. No one benefits from bad data. The more data law enforcement has access to, the less likely they will make a bad decision.

I doubt very much if anyone has the ability in America today to get criminal history or bench warrant data fraudulently entered into a database that could eventually be kicked up to Washington. Carelessly entered, perhaps, but that possibility has existed for decades and has not brought down the Republic.

Scott

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Rated +2
32 Votes

Sorry to clog up your blog

Sorry to clog up your blog even more, but this subject really interests me. :) I just got done perusing the JXML site and from what I saw, it's a HUGE step in the right direction. In fact, "Data Entry corruption" is limited in this model to the record-issuing entity, which would be a snap to determine and repair at any rate.
Kudos to Law Enforcement and government for money well spent on a simple and elegant approach.

Rate this
Rated +1
27 Votes

Brian V, Your comments are

Brian V,
Your comments are graciously accepted and welcomed. No clogs here!
Scott